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Armenia is one of the four members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was formally
established at the beginning of 2015. Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk write that pressure
from Russia following Armenia’s growing engagement with the EU left the country with little choice
but to sign up to the Eurasian Economic Union. However they argue that Armenia’s continued
interest in pursuing cooperation with the EU will represent an important test-case for the co-
existence between the EU and the EEU in the post-Soviet space.
The EU’s Eastern neighbourhood has been fractured: some countries (Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine) are seeking economic integration with the EU whereas Armenia and Belarus are pursuing
deep economic integration with the Eurasian bloc. However, there are important nuances in these
countries’ motives and interests in the respective integration blocs. Armenia is an instructive
example.
Armenia was widely viewed as a laggard in relation to the EU initiative. It seemed to have few
reasons to be enthusiastic about EU policies, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
and the Eastern Partnership. Firstly, Armenia lacks membership aspirations, in sharp contrast to Ukraine, Moldova
and Georgia. Second, the political regime (a non-competitive political system dominated by oligarchic groups) was
unlikely to embrace many of the reforms which it would be required to introduce. Finally, there was little
interdependence between Armenia and the EU in either economic or security terms, in contrast to Russia, with
which Armenia had a strategic alliance. All these reasons suggested that the EU was less important to Armenia than
was Russia, which was seemingly conﬁrmed by the country’s recent accession to the Russian-led Eurasian
Economic Union.
In fact, Armenia has actually been quite receptive to EU inﬂuence. The country has adopted a notable number of EU
policy and institutional templates over the last ﬁve years. Armenia’s substantial achievements in terms of legal
approximation resulted in the rapid conclusion of negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
(DCFTA) with the EU. Under the DCFTAs, partner countries are expected to incorporate approximately 90 per cent
of the EU’s corpus of rules. DCFTAs thus entail wholesale institutional and regulatory reform in key sectors of EU
internal market and trade policy, such as in the areas of food safety, competition, and intellectual property rights.
Prior to opening DCFTA negotiations, the EU issued ‘key recommendations’, which required Armenia to adopt
speciﬁc EU rules in key sectors, such as food safety standards, competition and state aid, intellectual property rights
and so forth. In order to open the negotiations, Armenia introduced the changes and was able to commence the
DCFTA negotiations early in March 2012. According to EU oﬃcials, it was an ‘easy country’ to negotiate with, in
contrast to Ukraine or Georgia; negotiations were completed in July 2013.
To a large extent, Armenia’s interest in the EU’s oﬀer reﬂects the few costs and many beneﬁts available to it. The
Eastern Partnership (launched in 2009) oﬀered timely remedies to the challenges presented by the country’s
speciﬁc context: i.e. a noticeable deterioration in the political, economic and geopolitical situation of the country. The
economic crisis of 2009 exposed the fragility of Armenia’s economy, with its heavy reliance on remittances from
labour migrants and its diaspora.
The deterioration of the regional environment (as a result of the 2008 conﬂict in Georgia and the failed
rapprochement with Turkey) only added to Armenia’s economic woes. In this context, the Armenian government had
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little choice but to deepen and accelerate reforms.
Modernisation emerged as a survival strategy for an
increasingly vulnerable Armenia and its authorities
and the EU oﬀer coincided with this domestic
demand for reforms.
In contrast to the ENP, the Eastern Partnership
provided new and tangible prospects: an enhanced
contractual framework (Association Agreements
combined with a DCFTA), the prospect of visa
liberalisation and increased sectoral cooperation.
Even though the EU’s eastern policy largely eschews
security issues that are pivotal for Armenia, it oﬀers
an unprecedented scale and intensity of linkages.
The EU’s oﬀer was all the more attractive as it did not
require (at least in the beginning) political reforms that
would entail power costs for Armenia’s elites. Under
the Eastern Partnership especially, the EU focused on sectoral regulatory approximation, initially leaving aside
polity-related changes such as democratisation and human rights as well as the rule of law. For Armenia, when the
Eastern Partnership was launched, the EU accepted the non-democratic political status quo after the 2008 political
crisis as a given without making explicit political changes a precondition for closer ties. Therefore, the modalities of
the EU’s policies vis-à-vis Armenia enhanced the country’s responsiveness to EU inﬂuences.
This interest was also underpinned by the perceived compatibility of EU templates with the security alliance with
Russia. The deﬁning feature of post-Soviet Armenia has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict. The protracted nature
of this conﬂict and ongoing fears of an attack by Azerbaijan elevated Nagorno-Karabakh to the foremost foreign
policy priority for Armenia. Armenia’s foreign policy was based on a combination of reliance on Russia to protect the
country militarily with dependence on the EU to promote its economic development.
Nevertheless, this perceived compatibility turned out to be short-lived. While initially Russia did not constrain
Armenia’s moves toward the EU, this abruptly changed in 2013. Russia became concerned over growing EU
inﬂuence in its neighbourhood at a time when it had launched its own economic integration project, the Eurasian
Customs Union (ECU), which was upgraded to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015. Armenia initially ruled
out membership in the ECU and only signed a memorandum on cooperation. Yet, Russia’s use of security
vulnerability (e.g. massive arms sales to Azerbaijan and threats of a surge in energy prices) forced the country to
reverse its decision. On 3 September 2013 President Sargsyan suddenly announced his country’s intention to join
the ECU.
However, even after Armenia’s U-turn and its accession to the EEU in January 2015, Armenia remains interested in
further engagement with the EU. But the exact nature of this engagement is in the process of being determined.
This is because the actual consequences of EEU accession in terms of sector-speciﬁc legal approximation remain
unclear. While Armenia worked towards the DCFTA until 2013, the EEU is still under construction. While a member
of the EEU, Armenia is interested in a new bilateral agreement with the EU. The EU and Armenia are completing a
scoping exercise which will serve as a basis for the future agreement to be negotiated.
In the eastern neighbourhood, Armenia was the ﬁrst country to experience a strong backlash from Russia in
response to its growing engagement with the EU. Armenia joined the EEU not because it wanted to but because it
had to for security and economic reasons. But it has few illusions about the EEU as a platform for modernisation
and the EU still remains a key partner in that respect. The proposed Armenia-EU agreement is now becoming an
important test-case for the co-existence (whatever form it takes) between the EU and the EEU in the post-Soviet
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space. Given the high geopolitical stakes, Armenia’s continuous interest in the EU will test Russia’s readiness to
tolerate the EEU member states’ independent foreign policy choices.
For more information on this topic, see the authors’ recent journal article in the Journal of European Integration
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